Portfolio Outstanding & Active Accounts
Mar 2020 – Mar 2026 · POS in ₹ Lakh Crore · Accounts in Lakh
₹9.3 L Cr
POS Mar-26
+13.9% YoY · +3.3% QoQ
171.6 L
Active Accounts Mar-26
+8.0% YoY · Consistent growth
₹5.42 L
Avg Outstanding / Account
vs ₹3.57L (Mar-20)
2.19x
POS growth FY20→FY26
Steady compounding
Portfolio Outstanding (₹ L Cr) vs Active Accounts (Lakh)
The most consistent compounding story in retail credit — no volatility spikes, no account pullbacks
Originations — Value & Volume
Annual FY2020–FY2026 · Stable growth trajectory
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Auto loan originations: the most predictable series in retail lending. FY20→FY26 CAGR of ~15% value, ~5% volume — reflecting steady unit sales + significant ATS expansion from premiumisation. The originations/POS ratio of ~44% confirms average loan tenures of ~27 months — consistent with 3–5 year auto loan norms at current repayment rates.
Annual Originations Value (₹ L Cr)
FY20–FY26 · Steady 12–15% annual growth
Volume (Lakh units) & Avg Ticket Size (₹ L)
Volume growth slow (ICE sales flat); ATS rising on premiumisation
Asset Quality — Best PAR Improvement Story in Retail
PAR 31-90 declined from 3.5% (Mar-20) to 2.2% (Mar-26) — a secular improvement over 6 years
✅
Auto loans show the best PAR improvement trajectory across all retail segments. PAR 31-90 dropped 130 bps over 6 years while POS grew 2.2x. This reflects: (1) improved underwriting via bureau data, (2) repossession efficiency increasing, (3) premiumisation shifting the borrower mix toward higher-income buyers. The PAR 91-180 reduction (1.1% → 0.5%) is particularly significant — it means fewer early-delinquency loans are rolling into the deep-stress bucket.
PAR Trend — Mar 2020 to Mar 2026
Secular improvement across all buckets — a quality upgrade story
PAR Data Table — All Periods
Consistent declining trend despite portfolio growth
| Period | PAR 31–90% | PAR 91–180% | 31–180 Combined |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar-2020 | 3.5% | 1.1% | 4.6% |
| Mar-2021 | 3.9% | 1.2% | 5.1% |
| Mar-2022 | 3.3% | 1.0% | 4.3% |
| Mar-2023 | 2.3% | 0.7% | 3.0% |
| Mar-2024 | 1.9% | 0.7% | 2.6% |
| Jun-2024 | 1.9% | 0.8% | 2.7% |
| Mar-2025 | 1.9% | 0.8% | 2.7% |
| Dec-2025 | 2.3% | 0.7% | 3.0% |
| Mar-2026 | 2.2% | 0.5% | 2.7% |
Average Ticket Size — Premiumisation Signal
ATS growing YoY driven by shift from entry-level hatchbacks to SUVs and crossovers
Avg Ticket Size at Origination — FY23 to Q1 FY26 (₹ Lakh)
Reflects India's SUV boom — avg loan now ₹8.8L vs ₹7.5L in FY23
Geographic Distribution — Q4 FY26
Auto loans are mid-tier urban — concentrated in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities; less rural than 2W or gold
Originations Value by City Tier
Q4 FY26 · Top 8 + Top 9-50 dominate at ~63%
Auto Loan Q1 FY25→FY26 Origination Trend
Quarterly growth slowing slightly — reflects auto industry volume plateau
Hidden Insights
Strategic signals in India's steadiest retail credit product
Insight 01 · Volume Plateau
Volume Growth Has Stalled — All ATS Growth Is Premiumisation, Not Penetration
Auto loan origination volume grew from 38.7L (FY23) to just 47.1L (FY26) — a 22% rise over 3 years. Meanwhile, origination value grew 37% (₹2.97L Cr → ₹4.06L Cr). The entire delta is ATS expansion: ₹7.7L → ₹8.6L. India's 4W market is not expanding its finance-eligible borrower pool — it's selling more expensive cars to the same base. This is a premium-market story, not a financial inclusion story, and it caps the addressable market ceiling for auto credit growth.
Volume CAGR FY23-FY26: 6.8% vs Value CAGR: 11.0%
Insight 02 · EV Transition Risk
The EV Transition Will Compress Auto Loan Tenures and ATS — A Hidden Medium-Term Headwind
EV 4Ws currently financed at lower LTVs due to uncertain residual values, faster depreciation, and battery replacement risk. As EV penetration rises (currently 2–3% of 4W sales), two things happen: (1) Blended ATS declines as EVs carry lower on-road prices after FAME subsidies; (2) Loan tenures shorten as lenders hedge residual value uncertainty. Neither is captured in current CRIF data, but both compress future portfolio outstanding growth relative to unit sales. Lenders with high OEM concentration in ICE vehicles face portfolio repricing risk.
EV 4W share ~2-3% of sales — residual value risk not yet in pricing
Insight 03 · PAR Seasonality
Dec-25 PAR 31-90 Spike to 2.3% Is a Seasonal Artefact, Not a Credit Deterioration Signal
Auto loan PAR 31-90 improved consistently from 3.5% (Mar-20) to 1.9% (Mar-25), then bumped to 2.3% (Dec-25) before settling at 2.2% (Mar-26). December is a peak-disbursement month — festive season and year-end car purchases generate high origination volumes. Fresh loans entered in Sep-Dec are only 1-3 months old by December reporting, mathematically inflating the PAR 31-90 numerator. The Mar-26 reading of 2.2% confirms the Dec-25 reading was noise, not structural deterioration. Analysts who flagged Dec-25 as a quality concern were misreading seasonal mechanics.
Dec-25 spike: 2.3% → Mar-26 normalised: 2.2% — seasonal artefact confirmed
Insight 04 · Used Car Gap
CRIF Data Covers New Car Finance — Used Car Lending Is the Hidden Growth Segment Not Captured
The auto loan data covers primarily new vehicle financing. India's used car market (estimated ~4M units/year vs ~4.2M new) is significantly undercaptured in formal credit. Used car loans carry 150-250 bps higher rates, 3-5 year tenures, and are dominated by NBFCs (Mahindra Finance, Shriram Finance). The PAR metrics for used car portfolios are substantially higher than new car portfolios. Lenders growing market share in used cars while reporting blended auto PAR metrics are presenting a misleadingly clean picture. Any formal data series that combines new and used car will show deteriorating PAR trends in coming years.
Used car lending: ~₹1-1.2L Cr est. portfolio — higher PAR, not in this data
Insight 05 · Competitive Structure
OEM Captive Finance Arms Are Displacing NBFCs — Market Share Data Understates the Structural Shift
Maruti Suzuki Smart Finance, Hyundai Motor Finance, Toyota Financial Services, and other captive arms are increasingly originating auto loans at dealer points at near-zero margins to drive sales. These entities appear in CRIF data under their parent categories but the degree to which captive finance is cannibalising bank and NBFC market share is not visible in aggregate data. When OEM captive rate wars push effective rates below bank cost of funds, traditional lenders either exit the segment or compress margins to compete. India is entering that competitive phase in FY26–FY27.
OEM captive arms: structural disruptors — not visible in aggregate share data